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Abstract
Novel outbreaks of emerging pathogens require rapid responses to enable
successful mitigation. We simulated a 1-day emergency meeting where
experts were engaged to recommend mitigation strategies for a new outbreak
of the amphibian fungal pathogen Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans.
Despite the inevitable uncertainty, experts suggested and discussed several
possible strategies. However, their recommendations were undermined by
imperfect initial definitions of the objectives and scope of management. This
problem is likely to arise in most real-world emergency situations. The exer-
cise thus highlighted the importance of clearly defining the context, objec-
tives, and spatial–temporal scale of mitigation decisions. Managers are
commonly under pressure to act immediately. However, an iterative process
in which experts and managers cooperate to clarify objectives and uncer-
tainties, while collecting more information and devising mitigation strategies,
may be slightly more time consuming but ultimately lead to better outcomes.
KEYWORD S
amphibians, chytridiomycosis, containment, detection, early warning, epizootic, expert
elicitation, mitigation, objectives, workshop
1 | INTRODUCTION
Of all major causes of biodiversity loss, emerging infectious
diseases of wildlife remain one of the most challenging to
address. Once a pathogen invades a new area, eradication
is typically impossible (e.g., Canessa et al., 2018; Carter
et al., 2009; Hallam & McCracken, 2011). However, greater
awareness of disease impacts is opening new possibilities
for rapid response. For example, when the fungus Bat-
rachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd) was described in 1998 as
causing amphibian chytridiomycosis, it had already been
driving widespread species losses since the 1970s (Scheele
et al., 2019). When a second related pathogen emerged in
the early 2010s (B. salamandrivorans, Bsal; Martel et al.,
2013), its threat was recognized more quickly than for Bd,
prompting the development of strategic plans for preven-
tion and reaction in Europe (www.bsaleurope.com) and
North America (www.salamanderfungus.org/resources/).
Framing such strategic plans as decision problems can
assist their development and implementation (Bernard &
Grant, 2019). Grant et al. (2017) developed a decision-
support analysis for proactive Bsal management, and Hop-
kins et al. (2018) used scenario-building to prepare
response frameworks for Bsal detection on public lands
in the United States. However, these general plans and
frameworks remain to be tested and a true emergency
response has rarely been implemented for a wildlife disease
(Mysterud & Rolandsen, 2018). For chytridiomycosis, sev-
eral Panamanian species were brought into captivity ahead
of the expected wave of Bd invasion (Gratwicke et al.,
2016). Yet even this action did not seek to actively respond
to the pathogen's arrival, instead aiming to mitigate its
long-term impacts through development of assurance colo-
nies and reintroductions.
2 | CASE STUDY: A SIMULATED
EMERGENCY MEETING TO INFORM
RESPONSE TO DISEASE DETECTION
In April 2019, we simulated an emergency meeting in
which a panel of experts was asked to recommend a
rapid response to Bsal detection. The 1-day workshop
was organized jointly with the international symposium
“Mitigating single pathogen and co-infections threaten-
ing amphibian biodiversity” hosted by the Zoological
Society London (UK). Attendees signed up voluntarily
for the workshop, without prior knowledge of the spe-
cific topic or structure, although a focus on mitigating
chytridiomycosis was anticipated. To give experts a prac-
tical context for the exercise, organizers presented a
realistic case study, based on a real case of Bsal detec-
tion in 2018 in the Netherlands, 200 km from the closest
known Bsal location in Europe. Two professionals from
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RAVON (Reptile, Amphibian, and Fish Conservation
the Netherlands), a nongovernmental organization that
routinely advises Dutch authorities on herpetological
conservation planning, attended the workshop and
acted as decision-makers in the simulation (A.S. and T.
S; S.C. facilitated). All other 24 attendees were scientists
with expertise in amphibian diseases or conservation
attending the above-mentioned international sympo-
sium (hereafter “the experts”).
For realism, experts were given no case-specific infor-
mation before the workshop. At the beginning of the
exercise, they were provided limited information avail-
able about the hypothetical Bsal detection: a brief sum-
mary of species, focal area, and Bsal detection history at
the site. The detection site was a single 235-m2 pond in a
multiple-pond system within the agricultural landscape
(Figure 1), where two dead crested newts (Triturus
cristatus) were found by volunteers during routine moni-
toring and subsequently confirmed as Bsal-positive by
laboratory testing (personal communication by co-
authors A.S. and T.S.).
Experts were given three management objectives,
agreed upon the previous day by the acting decision-
makers and facilitator: (a) minimize the probability of
Bsal spread from the detection site to neighboring sites,
(b) minimize collateral damage to the amphibian com-
munity, and (c) minimize collateral damage to nontarget
species and the environment.
Participants then articulated the uncertainty that
influenced their recommendations about mitigation
actions. The question of whether Bsal was present, but
undetected, at sites adjacent to the detection site was
perceived as particularly important for recommending
management actions. The only relevant information
available was that a limited number of newts sampled
across the neighboring ponds shortly after the initial
diagnosis (n = 37) all tested negative for Bsal. This infor-
mation was considered insufficient to infer Bsal presence
or absence (results of additional surveys in spring 2019
were not yet available at the time of our workshop).
Uncertainty was therefore further articulated into three
hypotheses: (a) Bsal is currently present only at the detec-
tion site; (b) Bsal is present at neighboring ponds
(i.e., within amphibian dispersal distance from the detec-
tion site—hundreds of meters); and (c) Bsal is present in
the surrounding landscape (>1 km from the detec-
tion site).
Participants then developed a set of mitigation actions
of different intensity. The group agreed upon five alterna-
tive actions: (a) implement basic biosecurity (Phillott
et al., 2010) when entering or leaving the detection site;
(b) prevent amphibian movement into or out of the site
by fencing and limit other wildlife movements into the
detection site (e.g., overhead netting to prevent bird
entry), and capture amphibians around the fence and
release them inside to reduce pathogen spread; (c) in
addition to the actions in 2, treat captured amphibians
with heat to clear putative Bsal infection (Blooi et al.,
2015) before release inside the fence; (d) install a fence
impermeable to most potential Bsal hosts and vectors at
the detection site, remove all animals from the detection
site and treat the site with chemicals using Virkon
Aquatic® (sensu Bosch et al., 2015)—the captured indi-
viduals could be euthanized, or quarantined and tested
FIGURE 1 Aerial image of the
case study landscape where Bsal was
detected. The green circles are
locations where newts were tested
for Bsal in 2018 (light green; n = 37
all negative). The red triangle is the
confirmed Bsal positive site in 2019.
Small circles indicate known
presence of Triturus cristatus
(orange) and Lissotriton vulgaris
(blue) at ponds between 2009 and
2019. Map orientation and
coordinates not provided
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for Bsal then disinfected; and (e) in addition to the
actions in (d), completely dry the waterbody at the detec-
tion site and return the captured and treated amphibians
to the site after water was again present.
We then used a modified Delphi process with four-
point elicitation (Hemming, Burgman, Hanea, McBride, &
Wintle, 2018) to obtain quantitative estimates of the
expected outcomes of actions under the different hypoth-
eses. In other words, experts were asked to estimate the
probability that each action would succeed in containing
Bsal spread if Bsal were present only at the detection site
or if it were present in neighboring water bodies or if it
were present across the adjacent landscape (three esti-
mates per action, each with the associated uncertainty).
Experts provided initial estimates individually; these
were summarized and displayed to the group using bar
plots, to allow opinions and information to be shared
among experts.
The ensuing discussion soon highlighted discrepan-
cies among experts about the decision context, particu-
larly about whether eradication or containment were
sought only from the detection site, from the broader
landscape, or from the province/region/country, and
about the size of the area that could be directly managed.
There was a wide array of implicit assumptions among
experts, fueled in part by the imprecise definition of
objectives against the three hypotheses about the current
spread of the Bsal outbreak. For example, if Bsal were
already present across the landscape, would action focus-
ing at one pond contribute at all to preventing its spread?
Would uncertainty about the broader presence of Bsal in
the surrounding landscape truly affect the decision to
manage the focal pond, or would pond-level actions be
undertaken regardless? These and other components of
the problem had been, to this point, interpreted in sub-
stantially different ways by different experts, which
meant that a comparison of individual estimates was not
meaningful. Further discussion failed to resolve these
issues, and the acting decision-makers were unable to
provide definitive responses about the objectives. A com-
plete revision of the decision problem appeared neces-
sary, but time did not allow it. Rather than pushing
through an artificially simplified solution, we chose to
terminate the exercise and focus the final discussion on
the difficulties encountered and lessons learned.
3 | DISCUSSION
Our workshop failed to solve our simulated decision prob-
lem, but it succeeded in its primary aim of highlighting
some key challenges likely to arise in emergency responses
to pathogen detection. Here we convert these challenges
into lessons learned. We identify stall-points that could eas-
ily arise in a real emergency wildlife-disease event with ele-
vated emotions and a broader set of stakeholders.
Resolving known stall-points ahead of a crisis can facilitate
and accelerate rapid responses when it really matters.
3.1 | Poorly defined objectives make
decisions difficult
Our workshop focused exclusively on engaging experts to
provide recommendations about which actions to imple-
ment. The workshop was free from many complexities
that are likely to arise in real emergency situations:
Experts had engaged voluntarily in the exercise, had no
personal stakes in its outcome, and there were no obvious
conflicts among scientists. Potentially challenging inter-
actions among decision makers and stakeholders, such as
obtaining access to private properties, were also not rep-
resented in the exercise. Experts generally felt comfort-
able discussing actions and providing scores, even
without elicitation training or experience, and interacted
well in small and large groups. While knowledge of
chytridiomycosis is still incomplete, it is probably suffi-
cient to devise an emergency mitigation plan. Despite
these favorable conditions, issues emerged that proved
insurmountable within the time available. Those prob-
lems did not arise from scientific disagreements about
disease dynamics and management actions but from
the unclear definition of the initial decision context (the
objectives, scope, and spatial scale of mitigation). The
importance of context and objectives is a central principle
of decision-making theory (Gregory et al., 2012) and a
recognized challenge to Bsal mitigation (Bernard &
Grant, 2019). We observed this challenge develop first-
hand, which could severely impede a real emergency
response where there is little room for error and delay.
Decision-makers should prepare for such an emergency
by clarifying the decision context as much as possible
before a real crisis occurs. A clear context, including
objectives, scale, and scope of the decision, will allow
experts to be more efficient and provide more informed
advice.
In the absence of clearly stated objectives and context,
experts will use their own experience to construct the
context from which they then advise decisions. During
our workshop, uncertainty about Bsal epidemiology and
the state of the outbreak in the wild highlighted our lack
of clarity in defining objectives. For example, the optimal
spatial scale at which to manage an outbreak is related to
its rate of spread across a landscape, but the scope of our
decision (whether objectives were at the local, regional,
or national level, and what time frame was being
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considered) was unclear, so experts struggled to provide
their estimates or based them on their own assumptions
about the spatial scale.
Objectives may need to be updated quickly to reflect
the current state of knowledge. In some cases, local infor-
mation may be accessed for additional information and
surveillance could be initiated that might yield results in
time for incorporation into the decision-making process.
In our case, if new monitoring confirmed Bsal presence
beyond the focal pond, the objective of minimizing
spread might change to large-scale eradication, and some
actions such as fencing would be inappropriate. If data
collection cannot be incorporated into the initial deci-
sion, managers might decide to precautionarily imple-
ment mitigation over a larger area. Data collection and
broader precautionary actions might also be combined, to
the extent allowed by the resources available.
3.2 | Ask quantitative questions of the
right experts
There is still much to be learned about wildlife diseases.
Many management decisions will depend on expert opin-
ion, especially in a crisis. Formal methods for expert elici-
tation may be perceived as time-consuming (even our
incomplete Delphi process took over a third of the 1 day
workshop). However, the problems in our scenario
emerged only when quantitative individual estimates
were shared and discussed with the group and divergent
assumptions became apparent. More informal, purely
verbal assessments might have failed to uncover different
personal interpretations, leading to a flawed recommen-
dation and a poor decision. Simply asking experts, or
even worse a single expert, for their intuition rather than
engaging them formally is likely to exacerbate such prob-
lems (Sutherland & Burgman, 2015). We recommend
eliciting written quantitative estimates, to facilitate dis-
cussion, analysis and reporting.
The composition of the expert panel is also important.
Discussions rapidly expanded our decision to include
impacts on nonamphibian species and the environment;
such multiple objectives are common and should be consid-
ered when assembling an expert panel. Our workshop was
planned around amphibians and the panel assembled
opportunistically, but an ecotoxicologist or a restoration
ecologist likely would have contributed to the discussion
about the collateral damage of mitigation treatments,
improving both the definition of objectives and the elicita-
tion of consequences (Game, Kareiva, & Possingham,
2013). Other types of experts may also be required (e.g., for
legal advice); again, decision-makers should anticipate
these needs and prepare as much as possible before the
emergency occurs. Finally, cultural and disciplinary diver-
sity is generally advantageous when assembling expert
panels (Sutherland & Burgman, 2015). Our exercise
involved scientists from Europe, the Americas, and Ocea-
nia, allowing us to hear a wide range of views and experi-
ences. However, this also meant there was little time to
establish a common knowledge base of the decision con-
text, for example, by clarifying the relevant European,
Dutch and local authorities and legislation (such as regula-
tions for accessing private sites, releasing chemicals into the
environment or killing nontarget species), or addressing
implicit assumptions about resource availability, willing-
ness to act, or species ecology. Preplanning, including a list
of experts, their areas of knowledge and contact details is
advantageous in reacting to an emergency.
3.3 | Iterative processes are necessary
but time-consuming
Facilitators of decision-making workshops often repeat
the process several times. This approach, known as
“rapid prototyping,” initially requires heavy simplifica-
tion but quickly highlights key problems on which a sec-
ond iteration can then focus (Gregory et al., 2012). In our
workshop, a second iteration might have sought a shared
definition of “spread” and “landscape” that satisfied the
decision-maker and gave experts a clear scenario for elici-
tation. This second iteration would have probably been
more efficient, as common language and objectives had
been developed and clarified in the first one. However,
we ran out of time for a second iteration. In comparison,
a 3-day scenario planning exercise for Bsal response in
the United States provided more information for policy-
makers, but it did not include an explicit quantitative
assessment of detailed actions (Hopkins et al., 2018). A
4-day workshop in Europe produced a complete quantita-
tive assessment of several Bsal mitigation actions but did
not involve a real decision-making context (Canessa
et al., 2018). Gerber et al. (2018) developed a full mathe-
matical model and decision process for landscape-scale
management of enzootic chytridiomycosis in boreal toads
(Anaxyrus boreas) over several months, including two
multiday workshops and iterated remote elicitation. Such
complex tools are obviously difficult to develop in emer-
gency situations; if possible, they should be prepared in
advance.
Disease outbreaks typically leave little time for
response, but also little room for error. Even 1–2 extra
days might allow a more informed decision, although
longer delays are obviously riskier (Scudamore & Harris,
2002). How long is too long depends on the local policy
context and on the characteristics of the disease: for
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example, Bsal might disperse slowly (Spitzen-van der
Sluijs et al., 2018), allowing managers more time—
possibly weeks—than in the case of pathogens spread by
more mobile hosts (e.g., Pseudogymnoascus destructans
causing white-nose syndrome in bats; Foley, Clifford,
Castle, Cryan, & Ostfeld, 2011). Again, such characteris-
tics may be unknown in the case of novel emerging path-
ogens and diseases, forcing decision-makers to rely on
expert elicitation and making uncertainty inevitable.
3.4 | Drills are not reality, for better or
worse
In a real emergency, urgency could give the decision-
maker a stronger resolve to act, but might also rush deci-
sions. For simplicity, we did not explicitly represent such
time and social pressures in our 1-day workshop. For
P. destructans, a similar recent workshop was successful
in reaching a decision for pathogen control (Bernard
et al., 2019). We did not provide information to experts
before the workshop, but the logistics of larger, interna-
tional meetings might allow some time for preparation.
Preselecting panels could make emergency meetings
more efficient when they are eventually called.
3.5 | Policy directions
Based on our experience, we suggest the following for
engaging scientists to define a rapid response plan for
pathogen invasions.
• Clarify the decision context as much as possible: iden-
tify the decision-maker and the spatial and temporal
scope.
• Assemble a mid-sized group (10–15) including man-
agers and experts, not limited to specialists of the focal
hosts and pathogen.
• Engage experts with clear questions but be prepared to
incorporate feedback and go back to clarify policy
aspects as needed. Presence of decision-makers at the
meeting should facilitate this process.
• Formal expert elicitation requires more preparation
than informal discussions, but is more effective and
transparent for identifying misunderstandings and pre-
senting results. Trained facilitators can assist.
• Take extra time as necessary without rushing to action.
Plan for multiple iterations of the decision-making pro-
cess, even if it means simplifying at the beginning.
Decisions made in the first days after disease detec-
tion can be crucial for mitigation success (Keeling &
Rohani, 2008). Effective collaboration between managers
and scientists before and after detection is the key to that
success.
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